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RECOGNITION.
In Miss Mar)' W. Calkins' full, able and, if I may be permitted to
say so, sympathetic review of my two articles on the ' Recognition
Theory' of Perception of Hoffding, Spencer, Ward and others, and
on Recognition, there is an important misunderstanding. By the omis-
sion of two words, indicated of course by asterisks, I am understood
and quoted as saying that there is in recognition no identification of
the past with the present. It is, I believe, a misunderstanding which
has very important bearings on a right understanding of recognition.
The remark I made was: " There is in recognition no ' identifica-
tion of the past impression with the present one. '" The ' past im-
pression ' I hold to be gone forever, to be no longer existent and hence
not a participant in any comparison or identification which may possibly
take place in recognition. Former theories of recognition have, I be-
lieve, misrepresented the facts by asserting that in recognition and
memory the ' former impression' is present and that it is known as
past or known again. Then by some special actus of the ' mind ' this
' past impression' is compared and identified with some ' present' ob-
ject and we know that this object is known again. Again, there is a
further actus supposed in the ' mind's' capacity of preserving, retain-
ing and bringing to light again the former impression or object. The
• Retentive Faculty' is still abroad if not openly, still covertly.
Now I hold that in recognition it is not the old or former impres-
sion or 'way in which consciousness looks at a thing' (call it what
name you will) which is present. It is gone and gone forever. It is
the object (I speak simply of ' things' as they appear in consciousness
and with no metaphysical theory in view) which is known as past or
known again and not the former impression. Upon the basis of cer-
tain characteristics, as I explain later, I classify some objects as ' past,'
some ' present' and others as ' future.' The former impression is not
present, for it no longer exists.
Pastness or the known-again-ness of objects cannot therefore be ex-
plained, as is usually done, by a comparison and identification of the
object of perception with the ' past impression.' Even if it did now
exist the comparison would be between two objects, and whence then
the pastness? How in the meanwhile has the object, as then per-
ceived, become ' past' ? If simply resurrected it ought to be the same
as before. Furthermore, it is a definition in a circle to explain past-
ness by bringing in this ' past impression' as an explanatory term of
pastness. That is the point to be more precisely elucidated by the
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definition. Why is an object regarded as past or known again ? Is
that ' past impression' which is used to explain pastness or known-
againness to be explained in its turn again by a comparison or identi-
fication with other ' past impressions' and so on ad infinitum ? We
know of no such process surely in consciousness. Or again, if an
object is known as past in itself, i. e., inherently or ultimately, there
appears to be no need of a process of comparison and identification
and if such be the case, how is it that we regard the same object or
event at one time as past, and at another as present, or future ?
This leads to the second point. Miss Calkins believes ' the cen-
tral eiTor of the theory' to be ' the assertion that recognition does not
imply identification or comparison.' It is further remarked that ' im-
mediate recognition does, nevertheless, include comparison with the
past experience of the subject, only the comparison is wavering and
restless, and the identification is incomplete.' As above stated, I did
not assert that identification and comparison in recognition were im-
possibilities or absent in the process. I merely said, "there is in rec-
ognition no ' identification of the fast impression with the present
one.'" (p. 269.) The process of comparison and identification may
enter into some cases of memory and recognition, but is not an in-
tegral and necessary part of every case of recognition. After an idea-
object (centrally excited) has arisen it may be classified upon certain
characteristics as 'past ; ' then the perceptual object (peripherally
excited) may be compared and possibly identified with the primary
object. The perceptual object may then be classified as known again.
In such a case comparison may be present, but it was not necessary for
the classification of the idea-object as past. So it is with most cases of
sudden recognition or of strange familiarity where we could not pos-
sibly have seen the object in question beforehand. Some character-
istic, usually appertaining to objects we call past, associates itself un-
wontedly with the object perceived and the classification naturally en-
sues. No ' past impression ' or even idea-object is apparently present
or necessary for the recognition in question. In the classification of
an idea-object as past, is it necessary that still another idea-object (past
or former, or what you will) should be present, compared and identi-
fied and so on ad libitum?
Objects as they appear in consciousness are in themselves neither
past nor present. So-called idea-presentations stand, in this respect,
equally on a par with the sense-presentations. Comparison or identi-
fication of a sense-object A with the centrally excited or idea-object a
will give us no recognition, simply object A or a. The pastness or
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known againness of either has still to be ascertained. Equally so,
and this is a point little regarded, does the fresentness, the nowness
of certain objects require to be explained.
An object may be regarded at one time as past and at another as
present. Why should it be thus classified differently at different times ?
Upon a consideration of these points I was led to note the character-
istics of the objects (and their possible accompaniments) in each case.
It then became evident that when objects were possessed of certain
characteristics as e. g:, lack of freshness and vividness, absence of de-
tails, unsteady, easily changeable localization, lack of persistency, air
of freedom, absence of certain muscle, joint and other sensations, the
sudden introduction into consciousness of an object by association of
ideas, which object does not in the case in question properly belong to
the object perceived, the great rapidity and often surprising ease and
quickness of the act of perceiving often accompanied by a second idea-
presentation of the same object immediately following, or often a feel-
ing of pleasure upon perception of an object, say a stranger in the
street, when the cause of the pleasure is unknown, etc., then, I say, we
have a consciousness of these characteristics and classify these objects
as past or known-again. If, on the other hand, they possess vividness,
full details, persistence or obstinacy of spatiahzation, persistency in
abiding under certain conditions, etc., then we have a consciousness of
these characteristics and put them in the other great class of objects
which we name -present. The former we call memories, the latter
perceptions. Thus it happens that upon an object centrally excited, pos-
sessing great vividness, persistency, etc., arising,there may ensue the
classification of it as belonging to ' objects present;' later it proves to
be an hallucination. It may also be added that objects may be possessed
of these characteristics, but they may not be noticed and there may be
no ensuing classification. In such a case, there is simply what I may
term ' object consciousness' passing on to another ' object conscious-
ness.' Neither the characteristics nor the classification, taken alone,
make up recognition, but both together. Moreover the characteristics
may be variable, now one, now many, now this, now that; the clas-
sification into either present or past objects remains, however, the same.
The characteristics are, however, obviously not the same for each
great group or class.
It is thus clear that I do not, as Miss Calkins affirms, ' treat the
past as the known-again-with-its-associates,' nor do I exclude com-
parison or identification from all cases of recognition. In my own ex-
perience in the majority of those cases of strange familiarity which are
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noted by BO many, the process appears to me to be in most cases a
surprising acceleration or ease in perception of the object which is un-
doubtedly hitherto unknown by me, and immediately following there-
upon a second presentation of the same object. Now this acceleration
and this consequent easy presentation of an object frequently given in
experience, are characteristics upon which I base the immediately fol-
lowing classification as known again or past. There may be thus pres-
ent comparison and classification, but it is evident from some of the
other characteristics that they are not necessarily always present. It
is said ' ' when a face 'seems familiar,' I am eagerly comparing it with
faces I have already 6een, trying to identify the present with the past."
It is quite obvious in such cases, however, that the comparison and
identification comes after the strange feeling of familiarity which may
be based on other characteristics than the presence of accompanying
idea-presentations. Moreover as above stated, it does not seem correct
to use the explanatory phrases ' past experience,' ' identifying the
present with the past ' etc., in explaining pastness.
ARTHUR ALLIN.
The points of disagreement between Dr. Allin and myself seem to
me to be mainly metaphysical, and should perhaps have been un-
touched in my notice of his intentionally psychological articles. As
I have there said, the "definition of the recognized as the 'known
again' is psychologically quite satisfactory, for psychology avowedly
adopts the matter-of-fact standpoint," that is, psychology deals with
facts of consciousness, or relatively isolated, single realities, immedi-
ate and temporally located.1 Now these facts of consciousness or im-
pressions as Dr. Allin might call them, never recur and never rise
from a buried past into a present. Under these circumstances the dif-
ficulty is to show why we do actually have an experience of what we
call identity; why, in spite of the evanescence of the facts or events
of consciousness, we do predicate sameness. The solution to this
problem seems to me to be suggested by the following line of thought:
besides the factual sort of consciousness, the series of conscious states
which truly does form the proper object of psychological investiga-
tion, I believe myself to possess, actually and immediately, another
sort of experience which is what I mean by the term ' self-conscious-
ness;' and it is the characteristic of this sort of experience to be non-
temporal and incapable of being split up into facts.
1Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 317, for a similar defini-
tion.
